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Keeping track of what others believe is a central part of human social cognition. However, the social relevance of those beliefs can vary a great deal. Some belief-attributions mostly tell us about what a person is likely to do next. Other belief-attributions tell us more about a person’s social identity. In this paper, I argue that we cope with this challenge by employing two distinct concepts of belief in our everyday social interactions. The epistemic concept of belief is primarily used to keep track of what other people take to be true, and this informs how we predict and interpret their behaviors. The symbolic concept of belief, in contrast, is primarily used as a means of signaling one’s social identity to other members of one’s community. In turn, community members closely monitor each other’s symbolic beliefs as a means of enforcing social norms.

Evan Westra works on the philosophy of social cognition, including topics like theory of mind, character judgment, and the psychology of norms. He also has interests in the ethics and of public discourse, the philosophy of animal minds and behavior, and the nature of mental representation. His research has been published in both philosophy and cognitive science journals, including Mind & Language, Cognition, Philosophy & Public Affairs, The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, Erkenntnis, Philosophical Studies, Review of Philosophy and Psychology, Biology & Philosophy, Philosophical Psychology, Synthese, and the Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology.

Before joining the Philosophy Department at Purdue, Westra held postdoctoral positions at York University and the University of Toronto, and before that he was an instructor at the University of Rochester. He is originally from Calgary, Alberta, Canada.