Eukaryon

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Abstract

The possibility of free will is one of the most contested philosophical issues and has recently gained popularity among academic subjects outside of philosophy.  However dubious it may seem, I argue that free will is merely an illusion; albeit, a necessary and useful illusion.  Hard incompatibilism posits that free will is incompatible with any notion of determinism or indeterminism, and furthermore, there is reason to believe that in scientific literature it is superfluous.  My research explores the possibility that the illusion of free will is an evolved trait necessary for human social structure, and therefore maintained in the population.  This study attempts to bring together what we can know through philosophical inquiry with our empirical knowledge about the living world.  This, I believe, is a worthwhile pursuit on the path to fully understanding human nature.

Introduction

As living beings we experience the world similarly to other living beings.  We search for nourishment, we reproduce, and we survive. However, we also do much more than eat, reproduce, and survive.  We have careers, we learn, we set and accomplish goals, and we socialize.  As rational beings, we behave differently than non-rational beings, such as plants and bacteria.  We expect, and believe, that being rational entitles us to a certain amount of control over our behavior.  We feel as if our rationality permits us to choose among future paths, and that we consciously make certain choices about our actions.  As rational and deliberative living beings, we defend our freedom to behave within our rights and subsequently, vehemently defend notions about the role of moral responsibility, autonomy, creativity, self-control, personal worth or dignity, and praise for our deeds or accomplishments in our daily lives.  All these factors, and more, influence our perception of the intentional and active role we play in society, as well as the role played by other individuals.  Generally, we believe that the autonomy to make decisions about our behaviors is an inherent property of our existence. 

Underlying these notions of the origins of our behavior is a presumed acceptance that we have free will.  Free will is our intrinsic ability to cause our behaviors and choose among differing possibilities without being constrained or manipulated by external, causal influences.  Having free will means that we believe our actions are caused by our own volition and are independent of any factors outside of our own causal agency, such as the laws of physics, nature, or other individuals.  Part of the experience of having free will is that we can plan and envision alternate scenarios about our future decisions without being affected by external causes.  Because our notions about the experience of free will are so convincing, we expect that individuals should be liable to blame and praise for the effects of their actions.  It is, however, my goal to provide an explanation for why this seemingly real experience of having free will is a false belief. 

My position is that the type of free will necessary for individuals to be morally responsible (deserving of blame or praise) for their actions is unattainable because our knowledge about the causal mechanisms underlying our system leaves no room for the necessary causal agency required to be truly free.  An individual cannot be held morally responsible for actions in which he or she did not act freely, and an individual who does not have free will cannot be held morally responsible.  Thus, individuals can only be morally responsible if, and only if, they have free will.  The rejection of both moral responsibility and free will is contingent on my argument that neither concept is reconcilable with any understanding of determinism or indeterminism. 

My discussion on causal determinacy is highly influenced by Spinoza’s monistic philosophy in conjunction with modern scientific advances.  Spinoza (1674) argued that everything in the universe occurs through necessity and that the only coherent account of nature comes from understanding the physical and mental states as equal.  As a scientist, I believe that our knowledge about the relationship between genetics, ecology and physics make it possible that causal determinism is a coherent reality. I use these beliefs to defend the position that causal determinacy precludes any notion of free will that would make us morally responsible for our actions in both a deterministic and indeterministic system.

Furthermore, even though I hold strongly to the position that free will is unattainable, I do not deny that our individual experience of conscious will, or conscious decision-making, exists.  I believe that our personal experience of conscious will guides important feelings of autonomy and moral responsibility.  However, agent-causal free will and the experience of conscious will are not one and the same.  Our experience of conscious will is not a manifestation of genuine free will because genuine free will is not attainable.  Instead, I argue that the experience of conscious will produces an overwhelmingly convincing illusion of free will, and that maintaining this illusion is critical to our evolutionary success as individuals.  Thus, the second part of this discussion is an argument that provides a novel idea for the origin and biological basis of this illusion of free will.

A Short History of the Free Will Debate

The free will debate is not a recent one and over the centuries has affected our knowledge about varying philosophical and scientific inquiries.  The problems usually associated with the “Free Will Debate” are ideas about determinism, whether any concept of free will is compatible with determinism, and recently, whether free will is attainable in an indeterminate system.  The answers to these questions have many implications, some of which are relevant to this discussion and include moral responsibility, accountability, blame- and praise-worthiness, and the role of quantum indeterminism, the laws of nature, and causation.  Philosophers and scientists alike have defended, as well as attacked, the notion that as rational beings we possess the power to change our course of action through our own volition.  However, as modern science began to prosper in the mid-1700s during the Scientific Revolution, advances in our knowledge about such things as the nature of microscopic particles, the role of genetics and environmental factors on our behavior, and most recently, the role of neurobiology and psychology in conscious decision-making, began suggesting differing ideas about the validity in accepting our behavior as a direct product of our free will. 

In the most general sense, the free will debate is composed of four distinct positions:  Hard determinism, libertarian incompatibilism, hard incompatibilism and compatibilism (Figure 1).  The first three positions listed are referred to as source incompatibilists because all agree that free will is a characteristic of agents that are the causal source of their actions.  The opposing position to source incompatibilism is leeway incompatibilism. This position denies that an agent must be the source of his or her actions.  Instead, agents that are able to choose among alternate possibilities can have a sufficient account of free will¹. This discussion will focus on defending a type of hard incompatibilism in relation to the opposing positions. 

The view that individuals exist in a fully determined system has been a position explored for centuries, and those who posit that events caused by deterministic processes preclude agent causation are known as hard determinists.  Hard determinists (Figure 1) defend the claim that the absence of agent-causality is due to the determined nature of our actions, which make genuine free will impossible.  Furthermore, the absence of free will inhibits moral responsibility (irrespective of any definition of morality or ethics).  Since free will is a necessary requirement for having moral responsibility and free will is incompatible with determinism, then ethics and punishment as defined today are unintelligible.  In the language of the free will debate, hard determinists defend determinacy and reject its compatibility with free will and moral responsibility.

Advances in quantum mechanics, though, introduce the possibility of true indeterminacy.  Quantum indeterminacy specifically refers to the impossibility of calculating the trajectory of microscopic particles regardless of the amount of information we have about them, such as their velocity, acceleration, and direction of movement.  The discovery of quantum indeterminacy was taken by some philosophers to mean that these quantum events provided the necessary freedom, within a deterministic system, for an agent to be free, and therefore, morally responsible for his or her actions.  Those with this thought generally continue to believe that determinism is incompatible with any notion of free will; in an attempt to salvage an agent’s concept of freedom they deny that determinism is true.  Therefore, the theory of quantum indeterminacy opened up the possibility that instances of genuine free will were attainable because agents could cause their own actions and decisions by being undetermined.

There are two major reactions from hard determinists in response to quantum indeterminacy.  First, they reject the possibility that there may be instances in which indeterminacy from quantum events could provide a substantial account of free will.  Secondly, they deny that quantum events at a microscopic level have any substantial implications at the macroscopic level of behavior.  They argue that quantum events at the microscopic scale could not be sufficiently related to events occurring on the macroscopic scale, such as in the mind or the body.  Furthermore, new findings in fields outside of physics, such as biology, neuroscience and psychology, provide mounting evidence that our behaviors are influenced on a grander scale by genetics and environmental factors.  Some hard determinists therefore argue that it is practically appropriate

¹ Although leeway incompatibilists have a differing requirement for what it takes to act freely, they still hold that determinism and free will are incompatible, and consequently, free will is not attainable.  This position is nonetheless important to the debate because the Principle of Alternate Possibilities has important implications for the state of moral responsibility and free will.

to talk about behaviors as being causally determined by preceding events, even though quantum indeterminacy may be true.  It became necessary and incumbent on hard determinists, however, to show that quantum events did not introduce significant evidence against deterministic behavior, and consequently, that quantum indeterminacy might even threaten the concept of free will in much the same way as determinism.

Consequently, the role of quantum indeterminacy in understanding free will added a new set of concerns:  Not only must we question if free will is compatible with determinism, but we must also ask about the role of indeterminism (introduced by quantum indeterminacy).  The compatibility issue between free will, determinism, and indeterminism spawned the start of a discussion surrounding free will, rather than a discussion about the evidence for or against determinism.  Free will was either compatible or incompatible with determinism and/or indeterminacy, and that answer would determine the state of our free will.  Proponents of the compatibilist view, those that assert free will is compatible with determinism, quickly gained credibility as they tried to ascertain that free will and determinism were reconcilable.  Compatibilists (Figure 1) shifted the burden of proof to determinists by changing the definitions of power and agency in order to reflect the ability to act freely in everyday situations.  In other words, compatibilists believe that if the agent has the power to desire or choose what to do, and is not constrained from doing so, then a sufficient notion of free will is possible.  From this, compatibilists also claim that if an agent has the power to act then it follows that the agent could in fact have the liberty to act and be morally responsible.  This is in contrast to the determinist definition of free will in that any notion of free will in a determined system is impossible. 

While a compatibilist interpretation of free will is compatible with determinism, it nonetheless fundamentally changes the notion of what it means to have free will.  Hard determinists argue that an agent is free only if he plays a causal role in determining his actions, but given that agent-causation is impossible in a determined system then the agent cannot actually be considered to act freely.  The compatibilist definition of free will, on the other hand, does not deny either determinism or free will.  In order to reconcile both free will and determinism, however, it is necessary that free will be defined not in terms of agent-causation, but as a liberty to act in accordance with determinism.  Thus, as long as the agent was not constrained to exercise his liberty to act, then for all intents and purposes, the agent should be considered free and morally responsible even though his actions are determined.  It is incompatibilist arguments against defining free will as a type of liberty and the intuition that a compatibilist definition of genuine free will is untenable that continue to shape the free will debate today.

Incompatibilist views on free will differ from compatibilism in that they advance the notion that free will and determinism cannot both be true.  Since free will and determinism are incompatible, then it must be that we either do not have free will or determinism is false.  Libertarian incompatibilists (Figure 1C) argue that determinism is false and we can have free will.  In doing so, however, they must provide evidence that quantum indeterminacy (which for them provides indeterminism) does not present the same problems to the notion of free will that determinism posits.  Instead, they must show quantum indeterminacy provides the agent with the necessary freedom by which she can experience undetermined and voluntary will to act freely.  Hard incompatibilists (Figure 1E), alternatively, believe that indeterminacy poses a real problem for free will because even stochastic processes do not prevent human actions from being causally determined.  Thus, they reject the compatibility between free will, determinism, and indeterminism by denying the existence of free will rather than rejecting either determinism or indeterminism.  In contrary to hard determinists (Figure 1D), hard incompatibilists accept that indeterminacy (not just determinism) precludes free will because events that occur by chance inhibit agent-causation in the same way as events that are determined². In fact, any combination of determinism and indeterminism precludes agent-causation and thus, eliminates the possibility of free will. 

These three positions (hard incompatibilism, libertarian incompatibilism, and hard determinism) are collectively referred to as source incompatibilism.  Source incompatibilists (Figure 1C-E) require that an agent be the source of his or her own actions in order to be morally responsible.  This is distinct from leeway incompatibilists (Figure 1B) who believe that being able to choose among alternate future possibilities (also known as the Principle of Alternate Possibilities) is enough to assign moral responsibility.  The source incompatibilist position, hard incompatibilism (Figure 1E), will be further discussed in chapter one.

The Implications of Accepting Hard Incompatibilism

Although there are several successor views of hard incompatibilism that still hold that the type of free will required for moral responsibility is not compatible with determinism or indeterminism (and thus there is no free will), there are those that remain noncommittal about whether universal determinism is true.  Although hard incompatibilists believe that indeterminacy plays the same role as determinism in precluding free will, most will argue that

² Recall that hard determinists believed in the incompatibility of free will and determinism because they deny that free will is attainable since our system is determined.

human behavior is regular and essentially determined, regardless of the indeterminacy of quantum events.  Hard incompatibilists must therefore deny compatibilists’ arguments, as well as libertarian incompatibilist arguments.  This means that as a hard incompatibilist, the task must include arguing against the definition of compatibilist free will as a tenable notion of free will, as well as reject that quantum indeterminacy allows for agent-causation.  The implication of defending a hard incompatibilist position, and therefore rejecting free will, is that notions about moral responsibility must radically change.  While subjective and personal beliefs about right, wrong, justice, ethics, and punishment are real, it is unjustifiable to assign moral responsibility to actions. 

Compatibilist and libertarian arguments for the existence of free will are not the only points that hard incompatibilists must reject.  Since the position denies free will it also questions the validity and coherency of societal virtues mentioned earlier, such as moral responsibility, autonomy, genuine creativity, self-control, personal worth or dignity, and blame or praise for our deeds.  Hard incompatibilists can address the consequences of questioning these societal virtues by arguing that they are either unnecessary or that the absence of free will does not necessitate losing them.  For some hard incompatibilists, the cost of losing notions of moral responsibility and autonomy far outweigh the knowledge that we do not have free will.  In fact, these hard incompatibilists take the Illusionist stance which argues that even though humans do not control their behavior as causal agents, and therefore do not deserve blame or praise, the belief and knowledge of this truth may actually promote dire and destructive consequences to the foundation of society, and consequently, the species as a whole.  Thus, they argue that the maintenance of this ‘illusion of free will’ is a necessity.

The understanding of what it means for one to have an illusion of free will underlies much of what it means to be human.  For example, as mentioned earlier, moral responsibility depends on the ability of individuals to be the cause of their own decisions.  Without the belief that individuals control and choose their actions, the acts of punishment and blame are not justifiable.  The acceptance of a hard incompatibilist argument would mean a restructuring of the way in which society views and treats moral responsibility.  It is not difficult to believe that the cost of accepting hard incompatibilist arguments may be much higher than simply accepting the type of free will promoted by libertarians and compatibilists.  This belief is a consequence of the way in which our actions can lead to blameworthiness and praiseworthiness in our current moral system.  By holding individuals responsible for behaving a certain way, in fact, our moral system perpetuates the illusion that we are in fact morally responsible for our actions.

From Hard Incompatibilism to a Trait for the Illusion of Free Will

Hard incompatibilist arguments can be formulated to promote the idea that free will is a necessary illusion.  This discussion will be a three-part examination of the state of free will using both philosophical and scientific language.  First, I will develop the hard incompatibilist argument that genuine free will, in which an agent is the causal source of her actions, is not attainable.  Then my goal will be to convince the reader that while I am denying that an agent has free will, I am not denying that he or she has, at the very least, a feeling and experience of consciously willing his or her actions.  I will defend this new concept as the illusion of free will.  By the illusion, I am referring to an inherent experience of conscious will; however, this illusion critically differs from genuine free will which involves agent causation.  Since we do not have agent-causal free will, we are left with an overwhelming feeling that we cause our actions through our experience of conscious will.  Finally, the last part of my discussion will address the possible identity and source of this illusion in a naturalistic context.

The first half of this discussion will show that while hard incompatibilism provides a coherent notion of why free will is incompatible with our current deterministic or stochastic system, it is nonetheless necessary for individuals to have the illusion of free will for there is much at stake without that belief.  Thus, as a broad introduction to my contribution on the debate of free will, I am proposing that we not only stop at accepting that free will is unattainable, but that we work to understand why we have an overwhelming and undeniable feeling that we cause our actions through our will when in reality we cannot.

The union of animal behavior theory, neurobiology, and psychology with the current philosophical discussion of the free will debate can provide novel insight into the state of free will.  Currently, the literature surrounding the debate does not provide the type of naturalistic account that I am hoping to place attention on.  Empirical studies focusing on the nature of determinism and indeterminism, and the role of each in decision-making, have not reached any conclusions and are mostly stagnant or riddled with debates about the semantics relating their findings and what they mean for free will. However, as some hard incompatibilists have proposed, whether reality is indeterminate, determined, or a combination of both, does not change the assertion that free will is incompatible with either view.  Therefore, in this examination of the state of free will, I believe that hard incompatibilism provides the best account for the type of illusory free will that exists. 

Another part of my argument is that having the illusion of free will is a necessary biological trait for several reasons that encompass findings from neurobiology, psychology, and animal behavior theory.  For several decades, neurobiologists have attempted to study when and where the awareness of goal attainment, or the feeling of conscious will, takes place in the brain.  Since I deny that agents have genuine free will, I believe that neurobiologists are on their way to identifying a possible mechanism for the illusion of free will located in the frontal lobe.  Cases of abnormal frontal lobe function, such as those seen in schizophrenic patients, are characterized by severe impairment of rational decision-making, such as the inability to remember past events, assign value to those events, and make appropriate future decisions; in other words, schizophrenic patients lose the experience of conscious will, or the illusion of free will.  Thus, my argument proposes that the illusion of free will is a quantifiable trait (as it is absent in patients with frontal lobe damage) and that a loss of the trait is fundamentally detrimental to an individual’s ability to interact with the world.  In other words, I believe that the illusion is an adaptive trait.  Since I argue that this trait is necessary, a loss of the illusion (and the consequences of the loss) in healthy subjects should provide that evidence.  Studies in which normal subjects believe they do not possess genuine free will do in fact act ‘less morally’ than control subjects.  As I propose that the illusion of free will is fundamentally a behavioral trait, it must be subject to the same principles of investigating any other behavior.  Namely, the illusion of free will must have an ultimate and proximate cause and it must be subject to Darwinian natural selection.  I propose a behavioral model for the illusion; however, given the degree to which this argument is new to the field, I believe that much more work is needed to fully understand its biological basis.

This discussion will be contingent on the reliability of certain definitions.  Free will refers to the potential for agents to cause an action to occur without the causal influence of any constraint, antecedent events, or stochastic events.  This definition of free will is logically equivalent to being morally responsible, such that any coherent notion of free will requires moral responsibility and vice versa.  The free will debate centers around two broad opposing viewpoints, compatibilism versus incompatibilism, which state that free will and determinism of any sort can be reconciled or are incompatible, respectively.  Quantum indeterminacy refers to the nature of stochastic, or random, events.  This definition is important to libertarian incompatibilism, as it is the only way in which a viable notion of free will can exist. 

The definition of predictability is also important because being unpredictable is an important type of behavior.  However, my position is that unpredictability is not tied specifically to either determinism or indeterminism, nor does being unpredictable have a major consequence on agent-causation.  Being unpredictable is still an effect of a causally determined antecedent event, and therefore, does not imply that unpredictability stems from agent causation.  This discussion is relevant because whereas libertarians need stochastic events for free will to exist, hard incompatibilists argue that neither random events nor determined events allow agents to have the necessary free will required for moral responsibility. 

Finally, that the human species carries a trait for the illusion of free will means that while we may not have the power to be agent-causal, and therefore do not have genuine free will, we still have an overwhelming sense that we cause our actions to occur through our experience of conscious will, and therefore, that moral responsibility is relevant.  I will propose that we treat this illusion trait as any other behavioral trait.  In other words, it must have a phenotype (having an illusion), it must have a proximate physical cause (which we can model in cases of frontal lobe damage, such as in schizophrenic patients), it must have a heritable genetic basis, and it must be characterized by an ultimate cause (the illusion of free will benefits evolutionary fitness).